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INFORMATION REPORT

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1. Since the breakdown of the Lord Stansgate - Ismail Sidqi talks on the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the official Egyptian attitude on the Sudan problem has been one of moderation and cautious protest. The Sudanese Delegation in Cairo and the National Front parties in the Sudan, on the other hand, continue agitation for more direct and forceful opposition by the Egyptians to the Sudanese independence movement fostered to some extent by the British. Because of this disagreement, relations between the Egyptian Government and the National Front parties - the Ashiqqa in particular - have become strained. An example of the current Egyptian attitude is seen in the incident of the recent visit of the Egyptian Bar Association's Delegation to the Sudan. Although the Egyptian Government officially condemned the action of the Governor-General in refusing to allow this delegation to assist in the defense of certain Sudanese political prisoners, it was actually a half-hearted effort, designed more to disarm the opposition than to force a showdown on the issue.
2. The Wafd, the Kutlah, and associated opposition parties in Egypt continue to make political capital of the Sudan issue, insisting on stronger backing for National Front activities. The Unionist, Ashiqqa and other Nationalist factions have collectively and separately sent delegations to the heads of various Egyptian extreme nationalist parties, protesting that, while the Sudanese people are resisting British imperialism, the Egyptian Government continues its attempts to negotiate with the British.
3. The relatively moderate stand of the Egyptian Government has at times proved embarrassing to Ismail al-Azhari, head of the Sudanese Delegation to Cairo. In May 1948, when the Delegation had been considerably weakened by internal dissension and alleged corrupt practices, Nuqrashi Pasha expressed his surprise to Azhari and Ali al-Birair that certain of the Sudanese parties should so hastily reject the reforms proposed by the British. Nuqrashi advised the pro-unity supporters to return to the Sudan and make an effort to gain a majority in the Legislative Assembly. Nuqrashi also requested Azhari to arrange for his own financial support while in Egypt and indicated that the 300-400 EE monthly subsidy furnished by the Egyptian Government might be withdrawn.

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4. Azhari, at that time, advocated the issuance of a royal decree by King Faruq denouncing the treaties of 1899 and 1936 and granting self government to the Sudan under the Egyptian crown. The effect of such a move, he claimed, would be to rob the Sudanese Independence Movement of much of its appeal and force. In August 1948 Azhari collaborated with professors of King Fu'ad University in preparing a draft constitution incorporating his theories of Sudanese autonomy. He had intended to submit the document to the Egyptian Cabinet with a view to having it officially adopted. Drafting of the constitution was not completed, however, and it was never submitted.
5. The Sudanese reform measures were discussed in detail by Khashaba Pasha, Egyptian Foreign Minister, and Sir Ronald Campbell preparatory to their promulgation by the Governor General. Several amendments were made in accordance with Egyptian demands. The most important of these amendments related to the powers of the Governor General in the event of a failure of the Constitutional machinery. Although Khashaba had pledged his support to the Ordinance as amended, the Egyptian Cabinet rejected it and opposed the embodied reforms. This rejection, which Azhari had previously predicted to his constituents in Khartoum, strengthened his wavering position to such an extent that he was subsequently re-elected to the leadership of the Sudan Graduates' Congress.

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